The Dangerous Global Consequence of a Syria Intervention

The Dangerous Global
Consequences of a
Syria Intervention

http://therealnews.com/t2/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=74&jumival=8662

PAUL JAY, SENIOR
EDITOR, TRNN:
Welcome to The Real
News Network. I’m
Paul Jay in
Baltimore.

We’re continuing our
series of
interviews, trying
to have a better
understanding of the
forces in conflict
and in play in
Syria. Now joining
us again is Sami
Ramadani. He’s a
senior lecturer in
sociology at the
London Metropolitan
University. He was a
political refugee in
Iraq, Saddam’s
regime. And he joins
us again now from
London. Thanks for
joining us again,
Sami.

RAMADANI, SOCIOLOGY
SENIOR LECTURER,
LONDON METROPOLITAN
UNIVERSITY: Most
welcome.

JAY: So, again, if
you haven’t watched
the previous parts,
well, you should,
because we’re just
going to pick up the
conversation. So
let’s start with
Russia and then
China, but Russia’s
certainly more at
play here. Why is
Russia sticking its
neck out on Syria,
sticking its neck
out meaning
getting into such
direct confrontation
with the United
States?

RAMADANI: A number
of issues with
Russia. I think
following Libya they
woke up to the fact
that the only Arab
country left with
close links to
Russia is Syria.
They’ve had close
links with Syria for
decades. They’ve
been arming the
Syrian army in
confrontation with
Israel for 50 years
or so, about half a
century or so. They
have a military base
in Tartus, the only
Russian military
base in the
Mediterranean.
Admittedly, it’s a
small base, nothing
like what the U.S.
has in the region,
but it’s a base
where Russian ships
can refuel and so
forth. It’s a
facility, a presence
in the
Mediterranean.

Also, they
understand the
regional game just
as well as the
United States does,
that if Syria goes,
then Iran is the
next target. And
Iran is obviously on
Russia’s borders,
and Iran is a very
strategic ally today
of Russia in terms
of geopolitics of
the entire world,
not just the region.

So combine Syria and
Iran and you get an
overall picture
where Russia feels
directly threatened.

JAY: So how far will
Russia take this?
Meaning: you know,
if they tryâ?�if the
Western countries,
particularly, you
know, the ones we’ve
been talking about,
Turkey, Saudi
Arabia, Qatar, the
United States, and
now some Europeans
jump in, I mean, if
they decide to
intervene without a
UN resolutionâ?�and
I don’t know if they
would, but perhapsâ?�how
far does Russia go,
in the sense that do
they continue to
support Syria in its
direct armed
conflict with the
West? And then where
does that lead?

RAMADANI: Well, I
mean, I take a
pessimistic view
that this thing
could, five years,
ten years down the
line, lead to a
world war, because
if Iran gets
attacked in this
conflagration, then
who says that Russia
will not intervene,
or China as well? So
you are talking
about a very
dangerous world
today,
unfortunately, Paul.

And one of the
reasons I say this
is that we also have
a world capitalist
economic crisis. The
world capitalist
economy, including
the U.S. economy, is
in deep crisis. And
if we study history
and look at history,
deep, deep economic
crises lead to wars.
Wars seem to be an
outlet for
capitalist economies
in deep crisis.
There is almost a
spontaneous
tendency. It doesn’t
need a lot of
planning, because
the
industrial-military
complex is massive.
It’s probably the
most important
segment of the
economy, and it has
political weight to
go with it. And if
war means that the
military-industrial
complex is a bit
happier, then wars
they will have. And
I fear that along
this very dangerous
contact line of
Syria, Lebanon,
Iran, Iraq, you are
talking about an
enormous potential
for conflict.

JAY: So your
argument is not only
is outside
intervention going
to up the nature of
the conflict in
Syria and be, as
you’ve described in
one of your
articles, a disaster
for the Syrian
people, but it could
wind up being a
disaster for the
entire globe.

RAMADANI:
Absolutely. I really
do, because of the
surrounding regional
problems and the
world economic
situation, and the
fact Russia is
regaining some of
its lost power
militarily, and
economically their
situation have
improved in the last
ten years, because
following the
collapse of the
Soviet Union, Russia
was in sixes and
sevens,
destabilized, very
weak economy, and so
on. They have picked
up quite a bit.

China has picked up
economically and
militarily. And I
don’t think they
today will accept a
total monopolar
world whereby only
the United States is
the dominant force,
or even NATO.

So you are talking
about emerging
countries, and they
mightâ?�India might
even jump ship and
go with China,
Russia. India still
is in the balance.
Will they feel
threatened by this
onward march towards
war? Or will they
throw their weight
with NATO and maybe
as a prize get
Pakistan and settle
the question of
Kashmir? You have
interlocking
problems.

JAY: Well, this is
why I said in the
last interview this
is feeling like
pre-First World War
in some ways,
although if you
throw in the
depression, it’s got
bits of the Second
World War, too. But
in either case it’s
extremely dangerous
situation. Let’s go
back into inside
Syria. Yeah, go
ahead.

RAMADANI: Just one
more final point
there, Paul, that
one of the reasons
Russia is becoming
intransigent on
Syria is again just
like my analysis
about the Syrian
opposition, the
democratic
opposition, and why
the Syria regime got
strangled is that
the armed opposition
is very closely tied
to Saudi Arabia and
the United States.
If those ties were
not as strong, then
Russia is not wedded
to Assad. They are
wedded maybe to
Syria or a Syria
which is not
completely allied to
the United States
and Saudi Arabia. So
they could tolerate
a regime change, but
not a regime change
in which the armed
opposition proxies
of Saudi, Qatar,
Turkey, and the
United States taking
over.

JAY: Okay. So what’s
the way out of this?
I know nothing we
say in this
interview is going
to change what’s
going on there. But
in terms of what the
sort of what you’re
calling the more
democratic forces
within Syria, what
are they calling
for? What do they
want now? And what’s
possible now?

RAMADANI: What I
read from them is
that obviously they
are very depressed
by what goes on. But
they still plug the
same line. And which
other line one would
really request from
them? They are
responding to the
demands of the
Syrian people. They
want democracy. They
want better
conditions for the
people. But they are
also saying, look,
if this armed
conflict continues,
Syria itself is
threatened, Syrian
society could
collapse, we will
have a situation
like Iraq and even
worse. I mean,
beyond that, what
else could they say?

JAY: Well, what I’m
hearing from some of
the Syrians I’m
talking to, some of
my friendsâ?�and
these are people
that have not beenâ?�are
certainly not, you
know,
pro-intervention;
they’re not pro-West
in that way. They
want Syria to be an
independent,
sovereign country.
Their sympathies
have been with the
more democratic, as
you call it,
opposition. They’re
against the
militarization of
the opposition. But
they’re saying the
only way out now is
the Assad familyâ?�Assad
himself, at least,
has to step down,
and then you could
have some opening
for negotiations,
that as long as
Assad’s there, you
can’t diffuse this
militarization. And
they say, you know,
the forces, the
pro-militarization
forces may not say
that’s enough, but
Syrian society might
shift and say, okay,
now the fighting has
to stop, Assad’s
gone, sort of what
happened in Egypt,
even though of
course a lot of
people will be
critical of what
happened there,
’cause you wind up
having Mubarakism
without Mubarak. But
still, that’s not
quite necessarily
analogous to Syria.
Anyway, the point is
is should people be
calling forâ?�against
intervention and for
Assad to step down?

RAMADANI: Well, you
see, the thing is
that I do not think
that the problem is
just Assad. Assad is
a symbol. And what
is happening is that
because of the armed
opposition wanting
the entire regime to
go, then people, the
elites around the
regime will not let
Assad go even if he
wants to go, if you
see what I mean,
because what they
are seeing is that
this opposition is
not a genuine Syrian
opposition, because
they could dealâ?�even
with the democratic
forces they could
give concessions.
They could get rid
of even Assad.

JAY: Now, hang on
one sec on that
point, because I’ve
talked to
journalists who have
been there, and
again it’sâ?�they
see a slice of what
life is there, but
they’ve talked to
lots of members of
the opposition,
including those
involved in the
fighting, and they
say that many of the
fighters are not
this sort of
hardcore Islamists,
they’re not just the
Syrian National Army
connected to the
Saudis, that there’s
a lot of indigenous
ordinary people
involved in the
fighting, and
they’re not justâ?�you
can’t characterize
them as not
genuinely Syrian.

RAMADANI: No, no. I
wouldn’t dispute
that, by the way. I
was trying to refer
to the main military
force, the people
who are being armed
with the
night-vision sniper
rifles, NATO, the
people who are being
armed with antitank
rockets.

JAY: And we’re
hearing today
they’re getting the
equivalent of
Stinger missiles
now. Apparently they
got 20, 30 missiles
that can fire and
bring down
helicopters.

RAMADANI:
Absolutely. Exactly
what the United
States did in
Afghanistan with the
mujahideen against
the Soviet forces,
if you remember.

JAY: ‘Cause it is
important to
distinguish, though,
that not all the
fighters involved in
armed struggle are
those people you’re
talking about.

RAMADANI: I think
those who are going
on the offensive are
mainly
foreign-backed. But
there are fighters
who defend their
families, who are
more defensive in
posture. And the
democratic forces in
Syria, I read their
literature. They do
refer to such
people. They say, we
know people who are
armed, but they are
armed to defend
their neighborhoods
or their families.
They do not go on
offensives. They do
not launch
operations suddenly
in Damascus or
Aleppo. So they make
a distinction.

These forces which
are going on the
offensive, trying to
occupy neighborhoods
and occupy cities,
they want to occupy
Aleppo, because
Aleppo is only
25â?�let me get this
rightâ?�about 25
miles from the
Turkish borderâ?�very
close. And if they
control Aleppo, they
control the supply
lines that come from
Turkey. They will
create a situation
like Benghazi in
Libya, they hope, so
that arms, heavy
arms and so on,
could flood into
Syria and they start
a frontal warfare in
Syria.

This agenda is a
foreign agenda. It
is not the Syrian
people’s agenda.

JAY: Now, if there
is to be armed
intervention, is the
force that it most
likely would be to
be Turks? It’s hard
to see otherâ?�I
mean, I guess, I
mean, the Americans,
but it’s hard to see
in an election year
Obama’s going to
bite off another
war, a ground war
here. I mean, maybe
something aerial.
But if they’re going
to go on the ground,
does it not have to
be the Turks and
maybe the Saudis?

RAMADANI: Sure.
There are would be
Turks, I’m sure, but
not necessarily they
go in as a Turkish
army. There are
enough Arab-speaking
Turks to go in.
There are Syrian
nationals also who
live in Turkey.
There are Saudis,
Qataris. Libyans, by
the way, in their
hundreds have gone
to Turkey and they
have infiltrated
into Syria. You have
fighters from all
over the world now
being called to
fight a jihad war in
Syria. So youâ?�and
according to the
famous Egyptian
journalist Mohamed
Hassanein Heikal,
Blackwater is
involved. They have
6,000 fighters whom
they trained in the
Emirates,
Arab-speaking
fighters who have
been infiltrated
into Syria. So
you’re talking about
a destabilization
campaign there.

I think the United
States is in such a
state now, a bit
like in Iraq: if
they cannot control
it, they don’t mind
seeing it destroyed.
And that’s a
terrible thing to
say, I know. But any
policymaker in
Washington, it’s a
dreadful thing, I
know, to suggest and
say that if you
can’t control a
place, well, let it
go to hell and get
it destroyed. But
that’s what will
happen in Syria. If
they don’t get a
regime to their
liking, they’ll try
to destroy Syrian
society. And that
suits an Israeli
agenda as well.

JAY: So to the
extent that people
outside Syria can
influence the policy
of their countriesâ?�and
I guess these days
it’s not so much.
But at any rate,
what do you think
people should be
demanding?

RAMADANI: I think a
demand should be to
stop the fighting.
The Syria regime has
to withdraw its
forces. The armed
opposition has to
stop fighting, give
a chance, a true
ceasefire, unless
Saudi Arabia, Qatar,
and Turkey say
ceasefire, they want
ceasefire, because
the ceasefire is
coming from Saudi,
Qatari, Turkey, and
United States.

JAY: Well, the only
way that happens,
really, I would
assume, is if the
Saudis, the Qataris,
the Turks, the
Americans shut the
flow of arms off.
But they are all
actuallyâ?�they’re
full steam ahead on
that.

RAMADANI: Yes. I
think if they don’t
shut the flow and
the money and call
for a genuine
ceasefire, there
will be a terrible,
terrible civil war
in Syria. And not
only the minorities
will suffer; some
40 percent of
Syria’s population
is various ethnic
and religious
minorities.

JAY: But the other
side of that my
Syrian friends want
is they want more
international
pressure than there
is, and I’m not sure
how much more there
could be, but they
want more pressure
to force Assad out,
to create some room
for negotiations.

RAMADANI: I think if
the armed opposition
stops, Assad’s
position will become
very precarious,
very precarious,
because then there
will be no excuse
for Assad to stay.
And even the elites
in Syria will say,
look, we have a
window here; the
armed opposition
have stopped because
Saudis, Qataris,
Turkey, and the
United States will
cut off supplies to
them if they don’t
stop; let us
withdraw the tanks;
let’s even get rid
of Assad; you see,
because this thing
is a dynamic, and
the dynamic at the
moment is that the
foreign agenda says
not only topple
Assad, but have a
pro-U.S. regime,
pro-Saudi regime in
Damascus. If that
agenda stays, then
the Assad regime
will fight to the
last and the elites
around him will
fight with him. And
the minorities will
not be with the
opposition, either.

JAY: Alright. Thanks
very much for
joining us, Sami.